1. Only Lin (1992), and those that were able to use Lin's data were able to create a measure of reform that was more finely graded than a time trend. Lin was able to create a variable that measured the number of villages in each year that had adopted decollectivization reforms.
2. It is more difficult to measure the effect of price changes on productivity, since, as in McMillan, Whalley, and Zhu (1989) and Jin et al. (2002), the price effects are removed before explaining TFP changes. In Lin (1992) and Huang and Rozelle (1996), however, there is evidence that higher prices are associated with higher rates of technology adoption, which has contributed positively to the rise in TFP during the reform era. Hence, price changes may have an indirect effect on TFP.
3. Kurkalova and Carriquiry (2002) attribute the rest of the decline (—35%) to weather effects. Weather effects caused 10% of output decline in the Macours and Swinnen (2000a) study.
4. The importance of accounting differences in the ownership status of plots (especially in distinguishing between private collective plots) is less important for the cases of East Asia and CEE. In China and Vietnam, farm households had small private plots—about 5% of total cultivated area—both before and after reform (Brandt et al. 2002). But, except for in some villages that allocated more land in the form of private plots to households at the beginning of the reforms, a vast majority of households saw no difference in private plots with the onset of reform. As the reforms have proceeded, the importance of the distinction between private plots and the rest of collectively allocated plots has decreased. Moreover, all studies of the effect of the reforms on farm output and productivity include both private and collectively owned plots. The work in CEE by Macours and Swinnen (2000a) also includes all types of plots. Moreover, although there was a clear distinction in the pre-reform era, after reform the importance of private plots diminished markedly.
5. The study indicates that labour measured in hours employed contracts significantly more strongly than 'agricultural employment', suggesting significant underemployment remaining on the large farms.
6. However important, technology is not the only factor affecting farm individuali-zation. Mathijs and Swinnen (1998) show how several other factors, including land reform policies and government regulations regarding farm privatization, also matter.
7. An important factor in the optimal scale of farming, besides scale economies in some technologies, is transaction costs in labour management. Large operations in agriculture face transaction costs because of principal-agent problems and monitoring costs in labour contracting which are typically large in agriculture (Schmitt 1991; Pollak 1985), although the importance varies with specialization and technology (Allen and Lueck 1998).
8. In Azerbaijan this productivity effect is not captured in the data in Tables 2.2-2.5 because the land distribution and farm individualization process only started in 1996. Average yields increased by 13% annually between 1997 and 2002 (Republic of Azerbaijan 2003).
9. On average, the man/land ratio was more than five times higher in East Asia than in Central Europe or Russia (see Table 5.1).
10. In contrast, agricultural labour use increased in many of the transition countries where individual farming grew strongly.
11. See Swinnen (2005) for a survey of the case studies and survey-based evidence.
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The Political Economy of Agricultural Transition
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